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Abstract. Twin-Field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) is a major candidate to be the new
benchmark for far-distance QKD implementations, since its secret key rate can overcome the repeaterless
bound by means of a simple interferometric measurement. Many variants of the original protocol
have been recently proven to be secure. Here, we focus on the TF-QKD type protocol proposed by
Curty et al [preprint arXiv:1807.07667], which can provide a high secret key rate and whose practical
feasibility has been demonstrated in various recent experiments. The security of this protocol relies on
the estimation of certain detection probabilities (yields) through the decoy-state technique. Analytical
bounds on the relevant yields have been recently derived assuming that both parties use the same set
of decoy intensities, thus providing sub-optimal key rates in asymmetric-loss scenarios. Here we derive
new analytical bounds when the parties use either three or four independent decoy intensity settings
each. With the new bounds we optimize the protocol’s performance in asymmetric-loss scenarios and
show that the protocol is robust against uncorrelated intensity fluctuations affecting the parties’ lasers.
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1. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1–4] allows two separated parties (typically called Alice and Bob)
to generate identical bit strings with information-theoretic security. Due to the loss in the quantum
channel connecting the parties, the performance of point-to-point QKD generally decreases with the
distance, being unpractical for far-distance applications. Nonetheless, there have been remarkable efforts
towards improving its range of applicability, such as the recent QKD experiments performed over 421
km of optical fiber [5] and over 1000 km of free space in satellite-to-ground links [6, 7]. However, even
for the most outstanding far-distance experiments, the secret key rate turns out to be probably too low
for commercial purposes. In fact, it has been proven that there exist fundamental limits on the secret
key rate that can be extracted from such point-to-point configurations. These limits say that the secret
key rate scales linearly with the transmittance of the quantum channel linking the parties, or in other
words, that it decreases exponentially with the channel length [8, 9].
Quantum repeaters [10–12] and measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) protocols with
either quantum memories [13, 14] or with quantum non-demolition measurements [15] are possible
theoretical solutions to overcome these limits. Unfortunately, in practice they require a technology
that seems to be far from available in the near future. A more realistic solution was proposed recently
by Lucamarini et al. [16]. They devised an MDI-QKD type protocol – called twin-field QKD (TF-QKD)
– in which the untrusted central node performs a single-photon interference measurement on the two
incoming pulses, causing the key rate to scale with the square-root of the channel transmittance by using
simple optical devices. Since the original proposal, several variants of the TF-QKD protocol were proven
to be secure [17–22] and some of them were experimentally implemented [23–26].
Here we focus on the TF-QKD scheme proposed in [18]. In this protocol, Alice and Bob use the
decoy-state technique to upper bound the detection probabilities associated to various photon-number
states (called yields), which are subsequently used to obtain a bound on the phase error rate. Importantly,
and in contrast to other solutions [17, 19, 21, 22] which use a post-selection step based on the matching
of a global phase, the scheme in [18] pre-selects the value of the global phase and thus it can provide a
higher secret key rate. Moreover, the practical feasibility of this scheme has been recently demonstrated
in [23,24,26]. A complete analysis of the symmetric scenario where both users analytically estimate the
yields using the same intensity settings was performed recently in [27]. However, using the same set of
intensities is an optimal strategy only when the quantum channels connecting the users to the central
node have approximately the same transmittance. Thus, the bounds derived in [27] are not suitable for
several real-world situations in optical networks where the distances between the users and the central
node can be notoriously different. Furthermore, assuming that the parties employ exactly the same
intensities is problematic even when the losses are symmetric. This is due to the fact that, typically,
neither Alice nor Bob can ensure that their lasers emit pulses with a perfectly locked intensity. Instead,
their intensities are typically fluctuating randomly and independently from the other party. For these
reasons, the derivation of yields bounds based on asymmetric decoy intensities is crucial for the protocol’s
security in the presence of intensity fluctuations and for addressing asymmetric-loss scenarios. A similar
analysis has been recently carried out for another type of TF-QKD protocol in [28].
In this paper, we address this problem by analysing the performance of the TF-QKD scheme
proposed in [18] in the presence of asymmetric losses and independent laser intensity fluctuations. For
this, we derive analytical bounds on the yields when Alice and Bob use asymmetric intensity settings. In
particular, we consider the practical cases where each of Alice and Bob uses three and four decoy intensity
settings, which are the most efficient solutions for covering long distances. In doing so, we show that the
protocol can tolerate highly-asymmetric loss scenarios and is quite robust against intensity fluctuations,
thus demonstrating its practicality for realistic network configurations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we summarize the TF-QKD protocol introduced in [18].
Then, in Sec. 3 we analyze the performance of the aforementioned protocol under the assumption that
Alice and Bob use the same signal and decoy intensities. In Sec. 4 we derive analytical bounds on the
yields when the parties are allowed to use independent decoy intensity settings. With the derived bounds,
we investigate the protocol’s performance in Sec. 5 when using independent signal and decoy intensities
and in the presence of uncorrelated intensity fluctuations affecting the users’ lasers. Finally, in Sec. 6 we
present our conclusions. The paper includes also a few Appendixes with additional calculations.
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2. TF-QKD
2.1. Protocol description
In this section we briefly summarize the considered TF-QKD protocol [18]. As shown in Fig. 1, it consists
in both Alice and Bob sending optical pulses through a quantum channel to an untrusted third party,
Charles, who is in charge of performing joint measurements on the incoming pulses and announcing the
results. The protocol is composed of the following seven steps:
50:50 BS
Fig. 1: Scheme of the TF-QKD protocol proposed in [18]. After selecting the X or Z basis randomly, Alice and Bob
send optical pulses through a quantum channel to an intermediate node controlled by the untrusted party
Charles. In an honest implementation, Charles makes the incoming pulses interfere in a 50:50 beam splitter
(BS) and publicly announces which of the two threshold detectors placed at the beam splitter output ports
clicks. For the X basis, Alice and Bob send coherent states |±αA〉 and |±αB〉, respectively. For the Z basis,
they send phase-randomized coherent states (PRCS) whose intensities are chosen at random from predefined
sets.
(i) Alice (Bob) chooses the X basis with probability pAx (p
B
x ) and the Z basis with probability
pAz = 1 − pAx (pBz = 1 − pBx ). For the X basis, Alice (Bob) prepares an optical pulse in a coherent
state |(−1)bAαA〉 (|(−1)bBαB〉), with bA (bB) being a randomly chosen bit and αA, αB ∈ R, for
simplicity. For the Z basis, Alice (Bob) prepares an optical pulse in a phase-randomized coherent
state (PRCS) ρµk (ρνl) whose intensity µk (νl) is chosen from a set SA = {µk}k (SB = {νl}l) with
probability pk (pl).
(ii) Both Alice and Bob send their pulses to an intermediate untrusted node, Charles, through optical
channels with transmittances ηA and ηB , respectively, in a synchronized manner.
(iii) Charles interferes the incoming pulses in a 50:50 beam splitter, followed by two threshold
detectors associated with the constructive (detector Dc) and destructive (detector Dd) interference,
respectively.
(iv) Charles announces the measurement outcomes kc and kd of the detectors Dc and Dd, respectively,
with kc = 1 (kd = 1) corresponding to a click event and kc = 0 (kd = 0) corresponding to a no-click
event.
(v) Alice and Bob reveal a small fraction of the bits bA (bB) collected from those events when both
parties chose the X basis and Charles reported a click only in one detector (kc+kd = 1) to estimate
the bit error rate. Their raw keys consist on the remaining undisclosed bits. Also, Bob flips all the
bits bB collected when the click occurred in Dd.
(vi) Alice and Bob publicly announce the intensities used in all the events when both chose the Z basis,
and they use that information to estimate the phase error rate.
(vii) Alice and Bob apply error correction and privacy amplification techniques to their raw keys to distill
two identical secret keys.
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2.2. Secret key rate
The asymptotic secret key rate of the protocol described above is lower bounded by [18]
R ≥ max{RΩcX , 0}+ max{RΩdX , 0}, (1)
where RΩX is a lower bound on the secret key rate that Alice and Bob can obtain from the event
Ω ∈ {Ωc,Ωd}, being Ωc ≡ (kc = 1 ∧ kd = 0) and Ωd ≡ (kc = 0 ∧ kd = 1). This lower bound is given by
RΩX = p
A
x p
B
x pX(Ω)[1− h2(euppZ,Ω)− fh2(eX,Ω)], (2)
where pX(Ω) =
1
4
∑
bAbB
pX(Ω|bA, bB) is the conditional probability that the event Ω occurs
given that Alice and Bob select the X basis, euppZ,Ω is an upper bound on the phase error rate,
eX,Ω is the bit error rate, f is the reconciliation efficiency of the error correction process and
h2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function. Note that in the asymptotic
scenario, which is the scenario we consider in this work, we assume for simplicity that pAx = p
B
x ≈ 1. The
upper bound on the phase error rate, euppZ,Ω, is given by [18]:
euppZ,Ω × pX(Ω) =
 ∞∑
n,m∈2N0
cn,m
√
Y Ωnm
2 +
 ∞∑
n,m∈2N0+1
cn,m
√
Y Ωnm
2 , (3)
where Y Ωnm ≡ pZZ(Ω|n,m) is the conditional probability of the event Ω given that Alice and Bob sent n
and m photons, respectively, cn,m = e
−α
2
A+α
2
B
2
αnAα
m
B√
n!m!
and N0 denotes the set of non-negative integers. The
yields Y Ωnm are not experimentally observed but can be estimated through the decoy-state method [29–31]
(see Sec. 4). The bit error rate is given by
eX,Ωc = pX(bA 6= bB |Ωc) =
1
4
∑
bA 6=bB
pX(Ωc|bA, bB)
pX(Ωc)
, (4)
eX,Ωd = pX(bA = bB |Ωd) =
1
4
∑
bA=bB
pX(Ωd|bA, bB)
pX(Ωd)
. (5)
The values of the bit error rate eX,Ω and of the probability pX(Ω) for a typical channel model are given
in Appendix A. These are the values we use in our simulations.
3. Symmetric intensities
When analyzing QKD protocols based on a central-node architecture, it is common to consider the
symmetric scenario where the transmittances of the channels Alice-Charles and Bob-Charles are equal.
This is, however, an unrealistic assumption. In a practical scenario, the loss introduced by the quantum
channel Alice-Charles could significantly differ from the loss in the channel Bob-Charles. In this case,
the yields bounds obtained by using the decoy-state technique with the same intensity settings for Alice
and Bob are not optimal anymore, i.e. they are looser than those obtained when the channel losses are
instead symmetric.
Indeed, as already shown in MDI-QKD [32–34], if Alice and Bob use the same intensity settings, they
might be in a situation where it is convenient for them to symmetrize the channels losses by increasing
the loss in one of the channels, in order to enhance the key rate. In doing so, the intensities of the
pulses arriving at the central node are now of similar magnitude, which results in an improvement of
the key rate. The same happens in the TF-QKD scheme introduced in [18]. This is clear from Fig. 2,
where we plot the secret key rate assuming that Alice and Bob use the same set of three and four decoy
intensities. The plots are obtained by using the analytical yields bounds for the symmetric-intensities
scenario derived in [27]. The experimental parameters used for the simulations are given in Table 1 and
the corresponding channel model is given in Appendix A.
In Fig. 2, the key rate is optimized over the signal intensity α2A = α
2
B and over the strongest decoy
intensity (assumed to be equal for the two parties), while the other decoy intensities are fixed to the
same values for both parties. As a matter of fact, after having observed that in the asymptotic scenario
the optimal values of the weaker decoy intensities tend to be as small as possible regardless of the
losses in the two channels, we fixed them to reasonably low values in the key rate optimization. More
precisely: the weakest and the second-to-the-weakest decoy intensities of Alice and Bob in the three-
and four-decoy case are fixed to 10−5 and 10−4, while the third-to-the-weakest decoy intensity in the
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Table 1: Experimental parameters used in the simulations. See Appendix A for the definitions.
Dark count probability pd 10
−7
Total polarization misalignment θ 2%
Phase mismatch φ 2%
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Contour lines for the secret key rate of the TF-QKD protocol introduced in [18] as a function of the channel
loss in Alice’s and Bob’s sides, assuming that both Alice and Bob use the same signal and decoy intensities.
Specifically, in (a) and (b) they use three and four decoy intensities each, respectively. The black dashed line
encloses the loss region where the key rate overcomes the repeaterless bound [9]. We note that for several
combinations of losses, it might be beneficial for the parties to increase the loss in one of the channels in
order to make them more symmetric, thus maximizing the key rate. The experimental parameters used in the
simulations are given in Table 1.
four-decoy case is fixed to 10−3. The resulting key rate basically reproduces the rate one would obtain
when optimizing even on the weaker decoy intensities [27]. The disadvantage of using symmetric signal
and decoy intensity settings is clear in both the three- and the four-decoy case, where increasing the loss
in one of the channels can lead to an increase of the key rate in asymmetric-loss scenarios.
Furthermore, as already mentioned in the introduction, assuming that Alice and Bob are using
exactly the same intensities is not realistic in most experimental implementations [24–26] due to the
intensity fluctuations on the transmitters’ lasers. The effect of intensity fluctuations was already
considered in [27] under the assumption that the fluctuations are correlated among the two parties,
which is satisfied in the experiment reported in [23], but does not hold in general.
4. Asymmetric intensities
In order to enhance the protocol’s performance in the presence of asymmetric losses and to investigate
uncorrelated intensity fluctuations, in this work we derive analytical upper bounds on the yields for the
three- and four-decoy scenarios with independent intensity settings for Alice and Bob. We note that the
use of three or four decoy intensity settings is already enough to obtain a secret key rate close to the one
that could be achieved with infinite decoy intensity settings [18, 27]. The derivation of these bounds is
presented in Appendix E and Appendix F. However, for illustration purposes, we present in this section
the resulting upper bounds for the three-decoy case.
According to the TF-QKD protocol [18] summarized in Sec. 2 –when both parties choose the Z basis–
Alice prepares a PRCS whose intensity belongs to the set {µ0, µ1, µ2}, with µ0 > µ1 > µ2. Analogously,
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Bob prepares a state whose intensity is instead drawn from the set {ν0, ν1, ν2}, with ν0 > ν1 > ν2. The
key assumption of the decoy-state method is that the yields are independent of the chosen intensities
and are thus subjected to the following four equality constraints:
Q˜k,l ≡ eµk+νlQk,l =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
µk
nνl
m k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2} , (6)
where Qk,l is the gain in the Z basis given that Alice and Bob choose intensities µk and νl, respectively.
Note that we omit here and in what follows, for readability, the dependency of the variables with Ω.
Being probabilities, the yields are additionally subjected to the inequality constraints:
0 ≤ Ynm ≤ 1 ∀n,m . (7)
By properly combining the constraints (6) with a procedure similar to Gaussian elimination, we can
obtain analytical upper bounds on the yields Y00, Y11, Y22, Y02, Y04, Y20, Y40, Y13 and Y31. The other
yields are trivially upper bounded by 1. The upper bounds are then inserted in the expression for the
phase error rate (3), enabling us to obtain a fully analytical expression of the asymptotic secret key rate
(1). In what follows, we present the resulting upper bounds on the aforementioned yields (we refer the
reader to Appendix E for their derivation). For this, let’s consider the most general combination of the
nine constraints (6):
Guv =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j . (8)
For simplicity, in (8) and also below, we omit the explicit dependence of the coefficients ci,j with the
value of u and v. Then, we can obtain an upper bound on the yield Yuv by appropriately choosing the
coefficients ci,j that appear in (8).
4.1. Upper bound on Y00
An upper bound on the yield Y00 is given by
Y U00 =
µ1µ2ν1ν2G00
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2) . (9)
where G00 is given by (8) by fixing the ci,j coefficients to those given in (E.54).
4.2. Upper bound on Y11
An upper bound on the yield Y11 is given by
Y U11 =
G11(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 + ν2)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2) +
Y U13
6
(ν1ν2 + ν0ν1 + ν2ν0) +
Y U31
6
(µ1µ2 + µ0µ1 + µ2µ0)
− (e
ν1 − ν1 − ν
2
1
2 − ν
3
1
6 )(ν
2
0 − ν22) + (eν2 − ν2 − ν
2
2
2 − ν
3
2
6 )(ν
2
1 − ν20) + (eν0 − ν0 − ν
2
0
2 − ν
3
0
6 )(ν
2
2 − ν21)
(ν1 − ν2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
− (e
µ1 − µ1 − µ
2
1
2 − µ
3
1
6 )(µ
2
0 − µ22) + (eµ2 − µ2 − µ
2
2
2 − µ
3
2
6 )(µ
2
1 − µ20) + (eµ0 − µ0 − µ
2
0
2 − µ
3
0
6 )(µ
2
2 − µ21)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2) .
(10)
where G11 is given by (8) by fixing the ci,j coefficients to those given in (E.16), and where the upper
bounds Y U13 and Y
U
13 are provided below.
4.3. Upper bound on Y22
An upper bound on the yield Y22 is given by
Y U22 =
4G22
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2) , (11)
where G22 is given by (8) by fixing the ci,j coefficients to those given in (E.6).
6
4.4. Upper bounds on Y02 and Y04
The upper bounds on the yields Y02 and Y04 are given by, respectively,
Y U02 =
2G02µ1µ2
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2) , (12)
and
Y U04 =
24G02µ1µ2
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(ν22 + ν21 + ν20 + ν0ν1 + ν0ν2 + ν1ν2)
, (13)
where G02 is given by (8) by fixing the ci,j coefficients to those given in (E.28).
4.5. Upper bounds on Y20 and Y40
The upper bounds on the yields Y20 and Y40 are given by, respectively,
Y U20 =
2G20ν1ν2
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2) , (14)
and
Y U40 =
24G20ν1ν2
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(µ22 + µ21 + µ20 + µ0µ1 + µ0µ2 + µ1µ2)
, (15)
where G20 is given by (8) by fixing the ci,j coefficients to those given in (E.36).
4.6. Upper bound on Y13
An upper bound on the yield Y13 is given by
Y U13 =
−6(µ1 + µ2)G13
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(ν0 + ν1 + ν2)
+
6 [eν2(ν1 − ν0) + eν1(ν0 − ν2) + eν0(ν2 − ν1)]
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν2)(ν0 + ν1 + ν2)
× [eµ2(µ21 − µ20) + eµ1(µ20 − µ22) + eµ0(µ22 − µ21)− (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)] , (16)
where G13 is given by (8) by fixing the ci,j coefficients to those given in (E.43).
4.7. Upper bound on Y31
An upper bound on the yield Y31 is given by
Y U31 =
−6(ν1 + ν2)G31
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(µ0 + µ1 + µ2)
+
6 [eµ2(µ1 − µ0) + eµ1(µ0 − µ2) + eµ0(µ2 − µ1)]
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν2)(µ0 + µ1 + µ2)
× [eν2(ν21 − ν20) + eν1(ν20 − ν22) + eν0(ν22 − ν21)− (ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν2)] , (17)
where G31 is given by (8) by fixing the ci,j coefficients to those given in (E.47).
5. Simulations
In order to obtain the optimal secret key rate in the asymptotic-key regime, one needs to optimize it over
the X basis intensities α2A and α
2
B , and over six or eight decoy intensities, depending on the number of
decoys used by Alice and Bob. The key rate depends on the decoy intensities through the yields bounds
derived in Appendix E and Appendix F. For instance, for the three-decoy case analyzed in the previous
section, we have that the vector of parameters to be optimized is ~p = (αA, αB , µ0, µ1, µ2, ν0, ν1, ν2). In
order to fairly compare the simulation results with those of the symmetric scenario (Fig. 2), we use the
same experimental parameters given by Table 1 and we again fix the weaker decoy intensities to the same
symmetric values for Alice and Bob, namely: µ1 = ν1 = 10
−4 and µ2 = ν2 = 10−5 for the three-decoy
case, µ0 = ν0 = 10
−3, µ1 = ν1 = 10−4 and µ2 = ν2 = 10−5 for the four-decoy case. Thus the key rate is
actually optimized over ~p = (αA, αB , µ0, ν0) in the three-decoy case, and over ~p = (αA, αB , µ3, ν3) in the
four-decoy case. As explained in Appendix F, note that in the four-decoy case, for convenience of our
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Contour lines for the secret key rate of the TF-QKD protocol introduced in [18] as a function of the channel
loss in Alice’s and Bob’s sides assuming that both Alice and Bob use independent signal and decoy intensities.
In (a) and (b), the parties use three and four decoy intensities each, respectively. The key rate is never
enhanced by increasing the loss in one of the two quantum channels, in contrast to the previous scenario
(Figs 2a and 2b). The black dashed line encloses the loss region where the key rate overcomes the repeaterless
bound [9]. The experimental parameters used in the simulations are given in Table 1.
notation, µ3 and ν3 denote the strongest decoy intensities, i.e., we use the ordering µ3 > µ0 > µ1 > µ2
and ν3 > ν0 > ν1 > ν2. Although having fixed the weaker decoy intensities to the same values for both
parties might seem restrictive in the asymmetric-loss scenario considered here, indeed it is not. As a
matter of fact, we observed that the optimal values of the weaker decoy intensities (i.e. µ1, µ2 and ν1, ν2
in the three-decoy case, µ0, µ1, µ2 and ν0, ν1, ν2 in the four-decoy case) tend to be as low as possible,
independently of the losses in Alice and Bob’s channels. We thus fixed them to symmetric low values
that are reasonable from an experimental point of view [23,24].
Fixing these parameters reduces the computation complexity of the simulations, which is important
since, in contrast to the MDI-QKD scenario [35], the key rate is not, in general, a convex function of ~p
(see Appendix C). This means that it is not possible to safely use time-efficient optimization methods,
such as, for instance, the coordinate descent algorithm [36]. Our optimization is thus carried out by
using the built-in global optimization algorithms of Wolfram Mathematica 11.0 [37].
In Fig. 3 we plot the asymptotic secret key rate as a function of the loss when the parties employ
independent signal and decoy intensities, and each party uses either three (Fig 3a) or four (Fig 3b) decoy
intensities. In both plots we observe that the improvement given by the use of independent intensities in
the asymmetric-loss regions is significant. That is, introducing extra losses in one of the channels does
not enhance the key rate any longer, in contrast to Figs 2a and 2b, where the intensities are instead
symmetric for the two parties.
The simulations suggest that in order to get a high key rate, it is important that the intensities
of the pulses arriving at the central node are of similar magnitude (but not exactly the same), so that
a cleaner interference occurs. This is clear from Fig. 4, where we plot the optimal signal and decoy
intensities in the three-decoy scenario, as a function of the loss in the channel Alice-Charles and for
fixed losses in the channel Bob-Charles. We note that the optimal signal intensities α2A of Alice (solid
lines) become greater than the correspondent ones α2B of Bob (dashed lines) as soon as the loss in Alice’s
side is greater than in Bob’s side. The same happens for the decoy intensities (µ0 of Alice and ν0 of
Bob) over which the key rate is optimized. Besides, when the losses at Alice’s and Bob’s sides are equal
(symmetric scenario), the optimal values of both the signal and decoy intensities coincide for Alice and
Bob, as expected. Moreover, the bottom plots in Fig. 4 show that the signal intensities arriving at the
untrusted node, i.e. ηAα
2
A and ηBα
2
B , are very similar to each other, while this is less pronounced in the
case of the arriving decoy intensities. For completeness, the analogous figure for the four-decoy case is
8
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
(a)
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
(b)
Fig. 4: (a) Optimal values of the signal intensities (α2A and α
2
B) and the arriving signal intensities (α
2
AηA and α
2
BηB)
both for Alice (solid lines) and Bob (dashed lines). (b) Optimal values of the strongest decoy intensities (µ0
and ν0) and the arriving strongest decoy intensities (µ0ηA and ν0ηB) both for Alice (solid lines) and Bob
(dashed lines). All the figures are plotted as a function of the loss in the channel Alice-Charles for three
different values of the loss in the channel Bob-Charles. The corresponding optimized key rate is given in
Fig 3a, where each party has independently three decoy intensities. We observe that it is optimal for the
parties to prepare the intensities of their pulses such that the signals arriving to Charles have similar intensities,
especially for the X-basis rounds. The experimental parameters used for the simulations are given in Table 1.
shown in Appendix D.
Apart from the general improvement in the secret key rate that the yields bounds derived in this
work entail in asymmetric-loss scenarios, the bounds also allow to incorporate uncorrelated intensity
fluctuations into the model, guaranteeing security in more realistic conditions. Fig. 5a illustrates how
taking into account the possible intensity fluctuations at the transmitters’ lasers affects the key rate. In
particular, the dashed lines are obtained by optimizing the key rate over the signal and decoy intensities
(we consider three and four decoy intensity settings), for symmetric losses in the two quantum channels.
We then apply uncorrelated fluctuations of fixed magnitudes on all the signal and decoy intensities of
both parties and take the worst-case key rate (solid lines), i.e. the one minimized by letting each intensity
independently fluctuate in its fluctuation range (centered on its optimal value). This effect has already
been analyzed in [27], where the fluctuations are, however, assumed to be perfectly correlated among the
two users. This is a quite restrictive assumption, which only occurs in practice in certain experimental
implementations based on the use of only one laser [23], but does not hold in general when two lasers are
employed [24–26], even in a scenario with symmetric losses. In order to directly compare the effect of
uncorrelated fluctuations with the results in [27], we fixed the weaker decoy intensities to exactly the same
values used in the intensity fluctuations plots of [27], that is: µ2 = ν2 = 10
−3 and µ1 = ν1 = 10−2 for
three decoy intensity settings, and µ2 = ν2 = 10
−3, µ1 = ν1 = 10−2 and µ0 = ν0 = 10−1 for four decoy
intensity settings. The figures suggest that the protocol is quite robust against intensity fluctuations
even when the fluctuations are uncorrelated among the two parties. In fact, the maximal tolerable loss
in the overall Alice-Bob channel for both the three and four-decoy scenarios decreases less than 2dB for
a 20% fluctuation of the signal and decoy intensities. Remarkably, even with a fluctuation magnitude
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Loss Alice-Bob (dB)
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Comparison between the secret key rate with optimal signal and decoys intensities (dashed lines) with the
secret key rates affected by increasing intensity fluctuations (solid lines): 20%, 30% and 40% (brighter colors;
right to left). The number of decoy intensity settings are three (red lines) and four (blue lines). In (a)
the losses at Alice’s and Bob’s sides are equal (symmetric-loss scenario) while in (b) the loss in the channel
Bob-Charles is fixed to 30dB. We assume that the fluctuations affect each decoy intensity and each signal
intensity of both parties in a independent way, i.e. the fluctuations are uncorrelated. The plots show that
the TF-QKD protocol is quite robust against intensity fluctuations. The weaker decoy intensities have been
fixed to the following values: µ2 = ν2 = 10
−3 and µ1 = ν1 = 10−2 for three decoy intensity settings,
and µ2 = ν2 = 10
−3, µ1 = ν1 = 10−2 and µ0 = ν0 = 10−1 for four decoy intensity settings. The other
experimental parameters are given in Table 1.
of 40% the decrease is still below 10dB. Similar conclusions hold for the asymmetric scenario shown in
Fig. 5b, where the loss in the channel Bob-Charles is fixed to 30 dB.
Finally, it is also interesting to observe how the optimal values for the signal intensities in the X
basis depend on the estimation of the yields in the Z basis. Fig. 6 shows the variation of the optimal
α2A and α
2
B (X basis) as a function of the loss in the channel Alice-Charles (the loss in the channel
Bob-Charles is fixed to 30dB) for three different levels of accuracy in the estimation of the yields (Z
basis). One can see that, when the yields’ estimation is not so tight, the X basis intensities α2A and α
2
B
tend to be small in order to reduce the weights cn,m of the yields appearing in (3) and compensate the
yields’ loose upper bounds. By increasing the number of decoys in the Z basis and thus the tightness
of the yields’ bounds as well as the number of relevant yields which are non-trivially upper bounded,
the optimal values of the signal intensities in the X basis also increase, showing that the optimal signal
intensities in the X basis depend on the number of decoy states used in the Z basis.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the performance of the TF-QKD protocol proposed in [18] under the
realistic condition of asymmetric losses in the quantum channels linking Alice and Bob to the intermediate
node. For this, we have derived analytical bounds on the relevant yields that appear in the phase error
rate expression when the parties use either three or four decoy intensity settings. In contrast to previous
10
Fig. 6: Optimal values of the signal intensities α2A and α
2
B (solid and dashed lines, respectively) as a function of the
loss in the channel Alice-Charles for different levels of accuracy in the estimation of the yields, i.e. assuming
that the parties have at their disposal three, four and infinite decoy intensity settings (bottom to top). The
loss in the channel Bob-Charles is fixed to 30dB. We observe that the optimal values of the signal intensities
used to prepare states in the X basis increase with the number of decoys used in the Z basis. For the infinite
decoy case, we assume that Alice and Bob can estimate the yields precisely and we used the theoretical values
of the yields, which are given in Appendix B. The experimental parameters used for the simulations are given
in Table 1.
results [27], the bounds derived here are valid in the general scenario of independent intensity settings
for the two parties, thus optimizing the protocol’s performance in the presence of asymmetric losses in
the two quantum channels. The simulations show a significant improvement on the secret key rate when
using independent signal and decoy intensity settings in several asymmetric-loss scenarios. In particular,
the secret key rate is never enhanced by adding fiber in one of the channels in order to symmetrize their
losses. Furthermore, we have demonstrated the robustness of the protocol against uncorrelated intensity
fluctuations on the transmitters’ lasers. These results clearly indicate the suitability of employing the
considered TF-QKD protocol in practical QKD networks.
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Appendix A. Asymmetric channel model
Here, we present the expected values of the quantities required to calculate the lower bound on the secure
key rate given by (1), in the case of a typical channel model. The loss between Alice (Bob) and Charles
is modeled with a beamsplitter of transmittance ηA (ηB). In order to model the phase and polarization
misalignments, let φ = δpi be a phase shift at Bob’s side for some parameter δ and let θA (θB) be the
polarization shift angle at Alice’s (Bob’s) side. Finally, let pd be the dark-count probability of Charles’
detectors, which we assume to be the same for both detectors. Let’s define for convenience
γ =
ηAα
2
A + ηBα
2
B
2
, (A.1)
χ(φ, θ) = αAαB
√
ηAηB cos(φ) cos(θ) , (A.2)
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where θ = θA − θB . Then it can be shown that the bit error rate eX,Ω and the probability pX(Ω) are
given by
eX,Ω =
e−χ(φ,θ) − (1− pd)e−γ
e−χ(φ,θ) + eχ(φ,θ) − 2(1− pd)e−γ , (A.3)
and
pX(Ω) =
1
2
(1− pd)(e−χ(φ,θ) + eχ(φ,θ))e−γ − (1− pd)2e−2γ . (A.4)
Finally, the observed gains Qk,l used by Alice and Bob to calculate the upper bounds on the yields Ynm
are just the probabilities that the event Ω occurred when Alice and Bob chose intensities µk and νl for
their PRCS. For this channel model it turns out that the gains read:
Qk,l = (1− pd)[e−(µkηA+νlηB)/2I0(√µkνlηAηB cos(θ))− (1− pd)e−(µkηA+νlηB)], (A.5)
where I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind. Note that due to the balanced redistribution
of the incoming photons in the central beam splitter, all the quantities presented here are actually
independent of which detector clicked, i.e. they read the same for Ω = Ωc,Ωd.
In the simulations in the main text we assume that both the total polarization misalignment and
phase mismatched are 2%, that is, we select θ = 2 arcsin(
√
0.02) and δ = 0.02.
Appendix B. Theoretical values for the yields
In order to check the quality of the analytical bounds on the yields, it is useful to compare them with
their theoretical values, i.e. the values directly inferred from the channel model and that Alice and Bob
would estimate when using an infinite number of decoy intensities. This is used, for instance, in Fig. 6.
The theoretical values of the yields Ynm, according to the channel model presented in Appendix A, are
given by
Ynm =
n∑
k=0
CAn,k
m∑
t=0
CBm,t
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
) t∑
j=0
(
t
j
) min(k,i+j)∑
p=max(0,i+j−t)
(
k
p
)(
t
i+ j − p
)
tan(θA)
i+p tan(θB)
i+2j−p
× (k + t− i− j)! (i+ j)!−(1− ηA)n(1− ηB)m, (B.1)
where the coefficients CAn,k and C
B
m,t are given by
CAn,k =
1
k! 2k
(
n
k
)
ηkA(1− ηA)n−k cos(θA)2k,
CBm,t =
1
t! 2t
(
m
t
)
ηtB(1− ηB)m−t cos(θB)2t.
Note that the values of the yields are independent of the event Ω.
Appendix C. Non-convexity of the secret key rate with respect to ~p
As one can notice from Eqs. (1)-(5), the dependence of the key rate R with its parameters is far from
trivial. Here we numerically analyze the convexity of the key rate function R(~p), being ~p the vector of
parameters to optimize by the users. It is well-known that this property is noticeably useful since convex
functions permit to use efficient optimization methods, which are very important when the length of ~p
increases. Unfortunately, it turns out that the key rate function is not convex in general, as shown in
Fig. C1, therefore making many efficient optimization algorithms work poorly.
For instance, if we consider the coordinate descent algorithm [36], it is clear from the plots that it
would not reach the optimal value if the starting point is any corner of the αA-αB plane and the first
variable to optimize is αB . Note that starting from a corner basically means that, in the first step, the
algorithm have to maximize the darkest or the lightest line in Fig. C1 (c), being both maximized when
αB is minimal. This means that, in the next step, the algorithm has always to optimize the darkest line
in Fig. C1 (b), which again has its maximum when αA is minimal. In Fig. C1, for simplicity, we assume
that Alice and Bob can estimate the yields precisely. That is, we assume they use an infinite number of
decoy intensities.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. C1: (a) Lower bound on the secret key rate as a function of αA and αB . Also, we show in (b) and (c) some
specific slices of (a). Here we considered the∞-decoy scenario, and the losses in Alice’s and Bob’s channels
are 20dB and 0dB, respectively. It is easy to note that the secret key rate function is clearly not convex.
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
(a)
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
Loss Bob-Charles=1dB
Loss Bob-Charles=20dB
Loss Bob-Charles=30dB
(b)
Fig. D1: (a) Optimal values of the signal intensities (α2A and α
2
B) and the arriving signal intensities (α
2
AηA and α
2
BηB)
both for Alice (solid lines) and Bob (dashed lines). (b) Optimal values of the strongest decoy intensities (µ3
and ν3) and the arriving strongest decoy intensities (µ3ηA and ν3ηB) both for Alice (solid lines) and Bob
(dashed lines). All the figures are plotted as a function of the loss in the channel Alice-Charles for three
different values of the loss in the channel Bob-Charles. The corresponding optimized key rate is given in
Fig 3b, where each party has four independent decoy intensities. Like in the three-decoy case, we observe
that it is optimal for the parties to prepare the intensities of their pulses such that the signals arriving to
Charles have similar intensities, especially for the X-basis rounds. The experimental parameters used for
the simulations are given in Table 1.
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Appendix D. Optimal signal and decoy intensities for the four-decoy case
In Fig. D1 we show, for completeness, the optimal signal and decoy intensities for the four-decoy case.
Appendix E. Upper bounds on the yields with three decoy intensities
Here we derive the upper bounds on the yields Y00, Y11, Y02, Y20, Y22, Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40 presented
in Sec. 4.
Appendix E.1. Upper bound on Y22
We consider the most general combination of the nine constraints (6):
G22 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i ν
m
j
 , (E.1)
and require that the terms proportional to Y0m, Y1m, Yn0 and Yn1 are removed in the combination. We
achieve this by imposing proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ci,0 + ci,1 + ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.2)
Yn1 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
νjci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν0ci,0 + ν1ci,1 + ν2ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.3)
Y0m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ c0,j + c1,j + c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (E.4)
Y1m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µici,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ0c0,j + µ1c1,j + µ2c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (E.5)
The linear system of equations given by (E.2-E.5) has a unique solution in the variables ci,j (up to a
global factor that we fix by imposing c0,0 = 1), which reads as follows:
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
ν2 − ν0
ν1 − ν2 ,
c0,2 =
ν0 − ν1
ν1 − ν2 ,
c1,0 =
µ2 − µ0
µ1 − µ2 ,
c1,1 =
(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c1,2 =
(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)
(µ2 − µ1)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c2,0 =
µ0 − µ1
µ1 − µ2 ,
c2,1 =
(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ1 − µ2)(ν2 − ν1) ,
c2,2 =
(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν1)
(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) . (E.6)
By substituting the solution for the coefficients ci,j (E.6) back into (E.1) one gets:
G22 =
∞∑
n,m=2
Ynm
n!m!
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)A22(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) , (E.7)
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where
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) ≡ µn1 (µ0 − µ2) + µn2 (µ1 − µ0) + µn0 (µ2 − µ1) , (E.8)
is the function defined in [27] when obtaining the analogous bound on Y22 in the symmetric-intensities
scenario (i.e. when the decoy intensities of Alice and Bob are drawn from the same set). Thus we can
employ the result from [27] and recast (E.8) as follows:
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) = (µ0 − µ2)(µ2 − µ1)
n−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−1−k
0 − µn−1−k1 ) . (E.9)
Of course we can employ this expression also for A22(ν0, ν1, ν2,m) by making the proper substitutions.
We will apply this consideration from now on to similar scenarios. By employing (E.9) into (E.7) one
gets:
G22 =
∞∑
n,m=2
Ynm
n!m!
(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2)
n−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−1−k
0 − µn−1−k1 )
m−1∑
j=0
νj2(ν
m−1−j
0 − νm−1−j1 ) . (E.10)
From (E.10) we deduce that the sign of Ynm’s coefficient is independent of n and m and it is the same
for all terms in the sum. Thus a valid upper bound for Y22 is obtained by setting all the other yields to
zero in (E.10), except for Y22. By doing this, we obtain (11).
Appendix E.2. Upper bound on Y11
We consider the most general combination of the nine equality constraints:
G11 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i ν
m
j
 , (E.11)
and require that the terms proportional to Y0m, Y2m, Yn0 and Yn2 are removed in the combination. We
achieve this by imposing proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ci,0 + ci,1 + ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.12)
Yn2 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ν2j ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν20ci,0 + ν21ci,1 + ν22ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.13)
Y0m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ c0,j + c1,j + c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (E.14)
Y2m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µ2i ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ20c0,j + µ21c1,j + µ22c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (E.15)
The linear system of equations given by (E.12-E.15) has a unique solution in the variables ci,j (up to a
global factor that we fix by imposing c0,0 = 1), which reads as follows:
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
ν22 − ν20
ν21 − ν22
,
c0,2 =
ν20 − ν21
ν21 − ν22
,
c1,0 =
µ22 − µ20
µ21 − µ22
,
c1,1 =
(
µ20 − µ22
) (
ν20 − ν22
)
(µ21 − µ22) (ν21 − ν22)
,
c1,2 =
(
µ20 − µ22
) (
ν20 − ν21
)
(µ22 − µ21) (ν21 − ν22)
,
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c2,0 =
µ20 − µ21
µ21 − µ22
,
c2,1 =
(
µ20 − µ21
) (
ν20 − ν22
)
(µ21 − µ22) (ν22 − ν21)
,
c2,2 =
(
µ20 − µ21
) (
ν20 − ν21
)
(µ21 − µ22) (ν21 − ν22)
. (E.16)
By substituting the solution for the coefficients ci,j (E.16) back into (E.11) one gets:
G11 = Y11
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 + ν2)
+
∞∑
m=3
Y1m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν21 − ν22)
A11(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
+
∞∑
n=3
Yn1
n!
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(ν1 + ν2)(µ21 − µ22)
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) +
∞∑
n,m=3
Ynm
n!m!
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)A11(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
(µ21 − µ22)(ν21 − ν22)
. (E.17)
The function A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) is defined in [27] when deriving the analogous bound in the symmetric-
intensities scenario. It reads:
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) ≡ µn1 (µ20 − µ22) + µn2 (µ21 − µ20) + µn0 (µ22 − µ21) , (E.18)
and can be recast as:
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) = (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ0)F (µ0, µ1, µ2, n) forn ≥ 3 , (E.19)
with F (µ0, µ1, µ2, n) being a non-negative quantity independently of the intensities, defined as:
F (µ0, µ1, µ2, n) ≡
n−3∑
k=0
µk2
(µ2 + µ0) n−3−k∑
j=0
µn−2−k−j1 µ
j
0 + µ2µ
n−2−k
0
 . (E.20)
By employing the expression (E.19) in (E.17) we obtain:
G11 = Y11
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 + ν2)
+
∞∑
m=3
Y1m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 + ν2)
(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν0)F (ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
+
∞∑
n=3
Yn1
n!
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(ν1 + ν2)(µ1 + µ2)
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ0)F (µ0, µ1, µ2, n)
+
∞∑
n,m=3
Ynm
n!m!
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ0)F (µ0, µ1, µ2, n)(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν0)F (ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 + ν2)
. (E.21)
By looking at (E.21), we deduce that a valid upper bound on Y11 is obtained by setting the yields Y1m and
Yn1 to their maximum allowed value and by setting to zero the yields Ynm, for n,m ≥ 3. In particular,
we use the upper bounds derived in Appendix E.5 and Appendix E.6 to bound Y13 and Y31, respectively,
while we set to 1 all the other yields Y1m and Yn1, for n,m ≥ 4. In so doing, we obtain:
G11 = Y
U
11
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 + ν2)
+
Y U13
6
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 + ν2)
(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν0)(ν1ν2 + ν0ν1 + ν2ν0)
+
Y U31
6
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(ν1 + ν2)(µ1 + µ2)
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ0)(µ1µ2 + µ0µ1 + µ2µ0)
+
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν21 − ν22)
∞∑
m=4
[
νm1
m!
(ν20 − ν22) +
νm2
m!
(ν21 − ν20) +
νm0
m!
(ν22 − ν21)
]
+
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(ν1 + ν2)(µ21 − µ22)
∞∑
n=4
[
µn1
n!
(µ20 − µ22) +
µn2
n!
(µ21 − µ20) +
µn0
n!
(µ22 − µ21)
]
. (E.22)
By isolating the bound on Y11 and summing the series, we obtain 10.
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Appendix E.3. Upper bound on Y02 and Y04
We consider the most general combination of the nine equality constraints:
G02 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i ν
m
j
 , (E.23)
and require that the terms proportional to Y1m, Y2m, Yn0 and Yn1 are removed in the combination. We
achieve this by imposing proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ci,0 + ci,1 + ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.24)
Yn1 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
νjci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν0ci,0 + ν1ci,1 + ν2ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.25)
Y1m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µici,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ0c0,j + µ1c1,j + µ2c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (E.26)
Y2m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µ2i ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ20c0,j + µ21c1,j + µ22c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (E.27)
The linear system of equations given by (E.24-E.27) has a unique solution in the variables ci,j (up to a
global factor that we fix by imposing c0,0 = 1), which reads as follows:
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
ν2 − ν0
ν1 − ν2 ,
c0,2 =
ν0 − ν1
ν1 − ν2 ,
c1,0 =
µ0(µ2 − µ0)
µ1(µ1 − µ2) ,
c1,1 =
µ0(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2)
µ1(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c1,2 = −µ0(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)
µ1(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c2,0 =
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
µ2(µ1 − µ2) ,
c2,1 =
µ0(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν2)
µ2(µ2 − µ1)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c2,2 =
µ0(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν1)
µ2(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) . (E.28)
By substituting the solution for the coefficients ci,j (E.28) back into (E.23) one gets:
G02 =
∞∑
m=2
Y0m
m!
(−1)(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)A22(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
µ1µ2(ν1 − ν2)
+
∞∑
n=3
m=2
Ynm
n!m!
(−1)B02(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)A22(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) , (E.29)
where A22 is given in (E.8) and B02 can be written as follows for n ≥ 3 [27]:
B02(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) = µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
n−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−2−k
0 − µn−2−k1 ) . (E.30)
We thus conclude that the sign of Y0m and Ynm’s coefficients are always equal in (E.29), regardless of
the values of the intensities. Therefore a valid upper bound on Y0m –for m = 2, 4– is obtained by setting
to zero all the other yields in (E.29). By doing so, we obtain the upper bounds on Y02 and Y04 given in
Eqs. (12) and (13).
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Appendix E.4. Upper bound on Y20 and Y40
We consider the most general combination of the nine equality constraints:
G20 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i ν
m
j
 , (E.31)
and require that the terms proportional to Y0m, Y1m, Yn1 and Yn2 are removed in the combination. We
achieve this by imposing proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn1 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
νjci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν0ci,0 + ν1ci,1 + ν2ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.32)
Yn2 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ν2j ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν20ci,0 + ν21ci,1 + ν22ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.33)
Y0m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ c0,j + c1,j + c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (E.34)
Y1m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µici,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ0c0,j + µ1c1,j + µ2c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (E.35)
The linear system of equations given by (E.32-E.35) has a unique solution in the variables ci,j (up to a
global factor that we fix by imposing c0,0 = 1), which reads as follows:
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
ν0(ν2 − ν0)
ν1(ν1 − ν2) ,
c0,2 =
ν0(ν0 − ν1)
ν2(ν1 − ν2) ,
c1,0 =
µ2 − µ0
µ1 − µ2 ,
c1,1 =
ν0(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2)
ν1(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c1,2 =
ν0(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)
ν2(µ2 − µ1)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c2,0 =
µ0 − µ1
µ1 − µ2 ,
c2,1 = −ν0(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν2)
ν1(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c2,2 =
ν0(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν1)
ν2(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) . (E.36)
By substituting the solution for the coefficients ci,j (E.36) back into (E.31) one gets:
G20 =
∞∑
n=2
Yn0
n!
(−1)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)
ν1ν2(µ1 − µ2)
+
∞∑
n=2
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
(−1)A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)B02(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
ν1ν2(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) , (E.37)
where A22 is given in (E.8) and B02 in (E.30). From (E.37) we observe that the sign of Yn0 and Ynm’s
coefficients are always the same, regardless of the values of the intensities. Therefore a valid upper bound
on Yn0 –for n = 2, 4– is obtained by setting to zero all the other yields in (E.37). By doing so, we obtain
the upper bounds on Y20 and Y40 given in Eqs. (14) and (15).
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Appendix E.5. Upper bound on Y13
We consider the most general combination of the nine equality constraints:
G13 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i ν
m
j
 , (E.38)
and require that the terms proportional to Y0m, Y2m, Yn0 and Yn1 are removed in the combination. We
achieve this by imposing proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ci,0 + ci,1 + ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.39)
Yn1 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
νjci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν0ci,0 + ν1ci,1 + ν2ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.40)
Y0m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ c0,j + c1,j + c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (E.41)
Y2m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µ2i ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ20c0,j + µ21c1,j + µ22c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (E.42)
The linear system of equations given by (E.39-E.42) has a unique solution in the variables ci,j (up to a
global factor that we fix by imposing c0,0 = 1), which reads as follows:
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
ν2 − ν0
ν1 − ν2 ,
c0,2 =
ν0 − ν1
ν1 − ν2 ,
c1,0 =
µ22 − µ20
µ21 − µ22
,
c1,1 =
(
µ20 − µ22
)
(ν0 − ν2)
(µ21 − µ22) (ν1 − ν2)
,
c1,2 =
(
µ20 − µ22
)
(ν0 − ν1)
(µ22 − µ21) (ν1 − ν2)
,
c2,0 =
µ20 − µ21
µ21 − µ22
,
c2,1 =
(
µ20 − µ21
)
(ν0 − ν2)
(µ21 − µ22) (ν2 − ν1)
,
c2,2 =
(
µ20 − µ21
)
(ν0 − ν1)
(µ21 − µ22) (ν1 − ν2)
. (E.43)
By substituting the solution for the coefficients ci,j (E.43) back into (E.38) one gets:
G13 =
∞∑
m=2
Y1m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)A22(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 − ν2)
+
∞∑
n=3
m=2
Ynm
n!m!
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)A22(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
(µ21 − µ22)(ν1 − ν2)
, (E.44)
where A22 is given in (E.9) and A11 is given in (E.19). We thus conclude that Y1m and Ynm’s coefficients
have always opposite sign in (E.44), regardless of the values of the intensities. Therefore a valid upper
bound on Y13 is obtained by setting to zero all the yields of the form Y1m for m 6= 3 and by setting
to 1 all the other yields of the form Ynm with n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2. In so doing, we obtain the following
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expression:
G13 =
Y U13
6
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2)(ν2 − ν1)[ν20 − ν21 + ν2(ν0 − ν1)]
(µ1 + µ2)(ν1 − ν2)
+
∞∑
n=3
m=2
[µn1 (µ
2
0 − µ22) + µn2 (µ21 − µ20) + µn0 (µ22 − µ21)][νm1 (ν0 − ν2) + νm2 (ν1 − ν0) + νm0 (ν2 − ν1)]
n!m! (µ21 − µ22)(ν1 − ν2)
, (E.45)
where we used in the series the original expressions of A22 and A11 that are given in (E.8) and (E.18),
respectively. By summing and rearranging the terms, we obtain the upper bound on Y13 given in (16).
Appendix E.6. Upper bound on Y31
In a similar fashion to Y13’s bound, one first removes the terms proportional to Y0m, Y1m, Yn0 and Yn2
from the general combination of the nine gains:
G31 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i ν
m
j
 , (E.46)
by properly fixing the coefficients ci,j as follows:
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
ν22 − ν20
ν21 − ν22
,
c0,2 =
ν20 − ν21
ν21 − ν22
,
c1,0 =
µ2 − µ0
µ1 − µ2 ,
c1,1 =
(µ0 − µ2)
(
ν20 − ν22
)
(µ1 − µ2) (ν21 − ν22)
,
c1,2 =
(µ0 − µ2)
(
ν20 − ν21
)
(µ2 − µ1) (ν21 − ν22)
,
c2,0 =
µ0 − µ1
µ1 − µ2 ,
c2,1 =
(µ0 − µ1)
(
ν20 − ν22
)
(µ1 − µ2) (ν22 − ν21)
,
c2,2 =
(µ0 − µ1)
(
ν20 − ν21
)
(µ1 − µ2) (ν21 − ν22)
. (E.47)
Then one substitutes the solution (E.47) back into (E.46) and gets:
G31 =
∞∑
n=2
Yn1
n!
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)
(ν1 + ν2)(µ1 − µ2)
+
∞∑
n=2
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)A11(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
(ν21 − ν22)(µ1 − µ2)
, (E.48)
where A22 and A11 are given in (E.9) and (E.19), respectively. By noting that the coefficients of the Yn1
terms have opposite sign to those of the Ynm terms, we derive an upper bound on Y31 by setting to zero
all the Yn1 yields (for n 6= 3) and to 1 all the other ones. The upper bound on Y31 is given in (17).
Appendix E.7. Upper bound on Y00
We consider the most general combination of the nine equality constraints:
G00 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i ν
m
j
 , (E.49)
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and require that the terms proportional to Y1m, Y2m, Yn1 and Yn2 are removed in the combination. We
achieve this by imposing proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn1 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
νjci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν0ci,0 + ν1ci,1 + ν2ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.50)
Yn2 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ν2j ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ν20ci,0 + ν21ci,1 + ν22ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (E.51)
Y1m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µici,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ0c0,j + µ1c1,j + µ2c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (E.52)
Y2m removed:
2∑
j=0
νmj
(
2∑
i=0
µ2i ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ20c0,j + µ21c1,j + µ22c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (E.53)
The linear system of equations given by (E.50-E.53) has a unique solution in the variables ci,j (up to a
global factor that we fix by imposing c0,0 = 1), which reads as follows:
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
ν0(ν2 − ν0)
ν1(ν1 − ν2) ,
c0,2 =
ν0(ν0 − ν1)
ν2(ν1 − ν2) ,
c1,0 =
µ0(µ2 − µ0)
µ1(µ1 − µ2) ,
c1,1 =
µ0ν0(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2)
µ1ν1(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c1,2 = −µ0ν0(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)
µ1ν2(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c2,0 =
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
µ2(µ1 − µ2) ,
c2,1 =
µ0ν0(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν2)
µ2ν1(µ2 − µ1)(ν1 − ν2) ,
c2,2 =
µ0ν0(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν1)
µ2ν2(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) . (E.54)
By substituting the solution for the coefficients ci,j (E.43) back into (E.38) one gets:
G00 =
Y00(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
µ1µ2ν1ν2
+
∞∑
m=3
Y0m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)A00(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
µ1µ2ν1ν2(ν1 − ν2)
+
∞∑
n=3
Yn0
n!
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)A00(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)
µ1µ2ν1ν2(µ1 − µ2) +
∞∑
n=3
m=3
Ynm
m!
A00(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)A00(ν0, ν1, ν2,m)
µ1µ2ν1ν2(µ1 − µ2)(ν1 − ν2) , (E.55)
where A00 is defined as [27]:
A00(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) ≡ µn1 (µ22µ0 − µ2µ20) + µn2 (µ20µ1 − µ0µ21) + µn0 (µ21µ2 − µ1µ22) . (E.56)
Using the result in [27], one can recast the function A22 as follows:
A00(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) = µ0µ1µ2(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
n−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−2−k
0 − µn−2−k1 ) , (E.57)
and notice that all the yields in (E.55) have coefficients with equal sign, regardless of the intensities’
values. Hence a valid upper bound on Y00 is obtained by setting all the other yields to zero (except for
the yield to be bounded) in (E.55). The upper bound on Y00 is given in (9).
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Appendix F. Upper bounds on the yields with four decoy intensities
In this case each party prepares phase-randomized coherent states with four possible intensities, namely
{µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3} for Alice and {ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3} for Bob. The yields are then subjected to the following
sixteen equality constraints:
Q˜k,l ≡ eµk+νlQk,l =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
µk
nνl
m k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} , (F.1)
and to the inequality constraints given in (7).
Below we derive tighter upper bounds on the yields Y04, Y40, Y13 and Y31, since the bounds derived on
the yields Y00, Y11, Y02, Y20 and Y22 in Appendix E are already good enough, i.e bounding them with
one additional decoy intensity would not result in a significant improvement of the performance of the
protocol. Note that the bounds presented here are not valid when two decoy intensities of the same party
have the same value. This case would then reduce to the three decoy intensity case. Thus, without loss
of generality, we assume the following ordering within each set of intensities: µ3 > µ0 > µ1 > µ2 and
ν3 > ν0 > ν1 > ν2.
Appendix F.1. Upper bound on Y04
We consider the combination of gains (E.29) that leads to the bound on Y04 in the case of three decoy
intensity settings:
G0,1,202 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,202 (n,m) , (F.2)
where the function C0,1,202 (n,m) is defined by the r.h.s. of (E.29), while G
0,1,2
02 is the combination of gains
given by (E.23), with the coefficients ci,j of the combination given in (E.28). The subscript indicates
the combination of gains to which it refers, while the superscript indicates the decoy intensities that
are involved, namely {µ0, µ1, µ2} for Alice and {ν0, ν1, ν2} for Bob. From Appendix E.3 we know that
the terms Yn0, Yn1, Y1m and Y2m are removed in (F.2), i.e. C
0,1,2
02 (n, 0) = C
0,1,2
02 (n, 1) = C
0,1,2
02 (1,m) =
C0,1,202 (2,m) = 0, for any n,m. Now that the parties have at their disposal the fourth decoy intensity (µ3
for Alice and ν3 for Bob), one can derive three additional combinations like (F.2) by simply replacing
one of the first three intensities with the fourth one:
G0,1,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,302 (n,m) , (F.3)
G0,2,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,2,302 (n,m) , (F.4)
G1,2,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C1,2,302 (n,m) . (F.5)
For instance, the combination (F.3) is obtained by replacing µ2 → µ3 and ν2 → ν3 in the function
C0,1,202 (n,m), thus obtaining C
0,1,3
02 (n,m). Regarding the r.h.s, G
0,1,3
02 is obtained by replacing µ2 → µ3
and ν2 → ν3 in the coefficients ci,j appearing in the combination G0,1,202 , and by making the substitution
Q˜2,l → Q˜3,l and Q˜k,2 → Q˜k,3 on the gains in G0,1,202 . In so doing, we obtain three more combinations of
gains (F.3-F.5) in which the terms Yn0, Yn1, Y1m and Y2m are removed.
At this point, we further combine the expressions (F.2,F.3,F.4,F.5) with arbitrary real coefficients di,j,k
2:
H04 ≡ d0,1,2G0,1,202 + d0,1,3G0,1,302 + d0,2,3G0,2,302 + d1,2,3G1,2,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
[
d0,1,2C
0,1,2
02 (n,m) + d0,1,3C
0,1,3
02 (n,m) + d0,2,3C
0,2,3
02 (n,m) + d1,2,3C
1,2,3
02 (n,m)
]
, (F.6)
‡ Note that we identify such a combination as H04 since it appears in bounding Y04. However the elements in the
combination, namely Gi,j,k02 , have a different subscript since they are borrowed from the bounds on Y02 and Y04 with three
decoy intensity settings.
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and impose that even the terms Yn2 and Y3m are removed:
d0,1,2C
0,1,2
02 (n, 2) + d0,1,3C
0,1,3
02 (n, 2) + d0,2,3C
0,2,3
02 (n, 2) + d1,2,3C
1,2,3
02 (n, 2) = 0 ∀n
d0,1,2C
0,1,2
02 (3,m) + d0,1,3C
0,1,3
02 (3,m) + d0,2,3C
0,2,3
02 (3,m) + d1,2,3C
1,2,3
02 (3,m) = 0 ∀m
d0,1,2 = 1 ,
(F.7)
where we fixed the remaining degree of freedom (global factor on all the di,j,k) by requiring that d0,1,2 = 1.
The solution of the linear system (F.7) reads:
d0,1,2 = 1
d0,1,3 =
(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2) [µ0(ν1 − ν3) + µ1(ν3 − ν0) + µ3(ν0 − ν1)]
(µ0 − µ3)(ν0 − ν3) [µ0(ν2 − ν1) + µ1(ν0 − ν2) + µ2(ν1 − ν0)]
d0,2,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν1) [µ0(ν2 − ν3) + µ2(ν3 − ν0) + µ3(ν0 − ν2)]
(µ0 − µ3)(ν0 − ν3) [µ0(ν1 − ν2) + µ1(ν2 − ν0) + µ2(ν0 − ν1)]
d1,2,3 =
µ0(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2) [µ1(ν3 − ν2) + µ2(ν1 − ν3) + µ3(ν2 − ν1)]
µ1(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(ν1 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3) [µ0(ν1 − ν2) + µ1(ν2 − ν0) + µ2(ν0 − ν1)] . (F.8)
By substituting the solution (F.8) back into (F.6) and by rearranging the r.h.s, one gets a combination
of gains where all the terms Yn0, Yn1, Yn2, Y1m, Y2m and Y3m are removed:
H04 =
∞∑
m=3
Y0m
m!
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3,m) +
∞∑
n=4
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, n,m) ,
(F.9)
where:
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3,m) = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)p04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3)
µ1µ2µ3 [ν0(µ1 − µ2)− ν1(µ0 − µ2) + ν2(µ0 − µ1)]
×
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3
νi1νi2 · . . . · νim−3
 ; (F.10)
p04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3) = µ0[µ1(ν0 − ν1)(ν2 − ν3)− µ2(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3) + µ3(ν0 − ν3)
× (ν1 − ν2)] + µ1 [µ2(ν0 − ν3)(ν1 − ν2)− µ3(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3)] + µ2µ3(ν0 − ν1)(ν2 − ν3) (F.11)
and
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, n,m) = −µ0µ1µ2µ3A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3,m)
×
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤in−4
µi1µi2 · . . . · µin−4
 . (F.12)
We assume that the indexes in the sums run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and we define∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3 νi1νi2 · . . . · νim−3 |m=3= 1. From (F.10) and (F.12) we deduce that the coefficients of
Y0m and Ynm have always opposite sign, hence the upper bound on Y04 is obtained from (F.9) by setting
all the yields Y0m (with m 6= 4) to zero and the yields Ynm (with n ≥ 4, m ≥ 3) to 1. After rearranging
the terms, we get the following expression for the upper bound on Y04:
Y U04 =
24
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, 4)
H04 − ∞∑
n=4
m=3
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, n,m)
n!m!
 , (F.13)
where H04 is given in the first line of (F.6), the function A04 evaluated for m = 4 reads:
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, 4) =
− (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(ν0 + ν1 + ν2 + ν3)p04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3)
µ1µ2µ3 [ν0(µ1 − µ2)− ν1(µ0 − µ2) + ν2(µ0 − µ1)] , (F.14)
and the series of B04 sums to:
∞∑
n=4
m=3
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, n,m)
n!m!
=
23
µ0 p04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3) [ν2(µ0 − µ1)− ν1(µ0 − µ2) + ν0(µ1 − µ2)]−1
(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)(ν0 − ν3)(ν1 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3)(ν2 − ν3)
×
[(
eµ0 − µ
2
0
2
− µ0 − 1
)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)−
(
eµ1 − µ
2
1
2
− µ1 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)
+
(
eµ2 − µ
2
2
2
− µ2 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3)−
(
eµ3 − µ
2
3
2
− µ3 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
]
×
[(
eν0 − ν
2
0
2
− ν0 − 1
)
(ν1 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3)(ν2 − ν3)−
(
eν1 − ν
2
1
2
− ν1 − 1
)
(ν0 − ν2)(ν0 − ν3)(ν2 − ν3)
+
(
eν2 − ν
2
2
2
− ν2 − 1
)
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν3)(ν1 − ν3)−
(
eν3 − ν
2
3
2
− ν3 − 1
)
(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν2)
]
.
(F.15)
We remark that in deriving the bound (F.13) we implicitly assumed that at least one of the following
equalities does not hold: ν0 = µ0, ν1 = µ1 and ν2 = µ2. Indeed, when all three equalities hold (i.e. when
Alice and Bob are using the same intensities settings for three out of four decoy pulses) one gets a “ 00
form” in the bound expression (F.13). In order to overcome this issue (which is not likely to happen in
practice due to intensity fluctuations), we derive an additional upper bound on Y04 which is valid in the
particular case of: ν0 = µ0, ν1 = µ1 and ν2 = µ2.
The procedure resembles that used in deriving (F.13). We start by considering the four combinations of
gains (F.2), (F.3), (F.4) and (F.5) and we impose the conditions: ν0 = µ0, ν1 = µ1 and ν2 = µ2. Let’s
indicate the resulting gains combinations as follows:
G˜0,1,202 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C˜0,1,202 (n,m) , (F.16)
G˜0,1,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C˜0,1,302 (n,m) , (F.17)
G˜0,2,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C˜0,2,302 (n,m) , (F.18)
G˜1,2,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C˜1,2,302 (n,m) . (F.19)
The tilde symbol above the gains combinations G02 and the corresponding yields coefficients C02 indicates
that we operated the substitutions ν0 −→ µ0, ν1 −→ µ1 and ν2 −→ µ2 in their original expressions.
We further combine the expressions (F.16), (F.17), (F.18) and (F.19) with arbitrary real coefficients
d˜i,j,k:
H˜04 ≡ d˜0,1,2G˜0,1,202 + d˜0,1,3G˜0,1,302 + d˜0,2,3G˜0,2,302 + d˜1,2,3G˜1,2,302 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
[
d˜0,1,2G˜
0,1,2
02 (n,m) + d˜0,1,3G˜
0,1,3
02 (n,m) + d˜0,2,3G˜
0,2,3
02 (n,m) + d˜1,2,3G˜
1,2,3
02 (n,m)
]
, (F.20)
and impose that even the terms Yn2 and Y3m are removed. The solution for the coefficients d˜i,j,k reads:
d˜0,1,2 = 0
d˜0,1,3 = µ3
d˜0,2,3 = − (µ0 − µ1)µ3
µ0 − µ2
d˜1,2,3 =
µ0µ3(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ0 − ν3)
µ1(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ1 − ν3) . (F.21)
By substituting the solution (F.8) back into (F.6) and by rearranging the r.h.s, one gets a combination
of gains where all the terms Yn0, Yn1, Yn2, Y1m, Y2m and Y3m are removed:
H˜04 =
∞∑
m=3
Y0m
m!
A˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3,m) +
∞∑
n=4
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
B˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3, n,m) ,
(F.22)
24
where:
A˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3,m) = − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ0 − ν3)
µ1µ2
×
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3
µi1µi2 · . . . · µim−3
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ3−→ν3
(F.23)
and
B˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3, n,m) = −µ0µ1µ2µ3 A˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3,m)
×
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤in−4
µi1µi2 · . . . · µin−4
 . (F.24)
We assume that the indexes in the sums run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3}, we define∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3 νi1νi2 · . . . · νim−3 |m=3= 1 and with µ3 −→ ν3 in (F.23) we intend that every µ3 contained
in the sum must be replaced with a ν3.
From (F.23) and (F.24) we deduce that the coefficients of Y0m and Ynm have always opposite sign, hence
the upper bound on Y04 is obtained from (F.22) by setting all the yields Y0m (with m 6= 4) to zero and
the yields Ynm (with n ≥ 4, m ≥ 3) to 1. After rearranging the terms, we get the following expression
for the upper bound on Y04 under the conditions ν0 = µ0, ν1 = µ1 and ν2 = µ2:
Y˜ U04 =
24
A˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3, 4)
H˜04 − ∞∑
n=4
m=3
B˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3, n,m)
n!m!
 , (F.25)
where H˜04 is given in the first line of (F.20), the function A˜04 evaluated for m = 4 reads:
A˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3, 4) = − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ0 − ν3)
µ1µ2
(µ0 + µ1 + µ2 + ν3) ,(F.26)
and the series of B˜04 sums to:
∞∑
n=4
m=3
B˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν3, n,m)
n!m!
=
µ0µ3
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)(µ1 − ν3)(µ2 − ν3)
×
[(
eµ0 − µ
2
0
2
− µ0 − 1
)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)−
(
eµ1 − µ
2
1
2
− µ1 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)
+
(
eµ2 − µ
2
2
2
− µ2 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3)−
(
eµ3 − µ
2
3
2
− µ3 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
]
×
[(
eµ0 − µ
2
0
2
− µ0 − 1
)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − ν3)(µ2 − ν3)−
(
eµ1 − µ
2
1
2
− µ1 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − ν3)(µ2 − ν3)
+
(
eµ2 − µ
2
2
2
− µ2 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − ν3)(µ1 − ν3)−
(
eν3 − ν
2
3
2
− ν3 − 1
)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
]
.
(F.27)
Appendix F.2. Upper bound on Y40
Similarly to the bound on Y04, we consider the combination of gains (E.37) that leads to the bound on
Y40 in the case of three decoy intensity settings:
G0,1,220 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,220 (n,m) , (F.28)
where the function C0,1,220 (n,m) is defined by the r.h.s. of (E.37), while G
0,1,2
20 is the combination of gains
given by (E.31), with the coefficients ci,j of the combination given in (E.36). From Appendix E.4 we know
that the terms Yn1, Yn2, Y0m and Y1m are removed in (F.28). Following the same procedure described
25
in Appendix F.1, we derive three additional combinations of gains in which the terms Yn1, Yn2, Y0m and
Y1m are removed:
G0,1,320 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,320 (n,m) , (F.29)
G0,2,320 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,2,320 (n,m) , (F.30)
G1,2,320 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C1,2,320 (n,m) . (F.31)
Now we further combine these expressions with arbitrary real coefficients di,j,k:
H40 ≡ d0,1,2G0,1,220 + d0,1,3G0,1,320 + d0,2,3G0,2,320 + d1,2,3G1,2,320 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
[
d0,1,2C
0,1,2
20 (n,m) + d0,1,3C
0,1,3
20 (n,m) + d0,2,3C
0,2,3
20 (n,m) + d1,2,3C
1,2,3
20 (n,m)
]
, (F.32)
and impose that even the terms Yn3 and Y2m are removed from the r.h.s. of (F.32). This yields a linear
system of equations in the variables di,j,k, whose unique solution (up to a global rescaling) reads as
follows:
d0,1,2 = 1
d0,1,3 =
(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν2) [µ0(ν1 − ν3) + µ1(ν3 − ν0) + µ3(ν0 − ν1)]
(µ0 − µ3)(ν0 − ν3) [µ0(ν2 − ν1) + µ1(ν0 − ν2) + µ2(ν1 − ν0)]
d0,2,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)(ν0 − ν1) [µ0(ν2 − ν3) + µ2(ν3 − ν0) + µ3(ν0 − ν2)]
(µ0 − µ3)(ν0 − ν3) [µ0(ν1 − ν2) + µ1(ν2 − ν0) + µ2(ν0 − ν1)]
d1,2,3 =
ν0(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2) [µ1(ν3 − ν2) + µ2(ν1 − ν3) + µ3(ν2 − ν1)]
ν1(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(ν1 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3) [µ0(ν1 − ν2) + µ1(ν2 − ν0) + µ2(ν0 − ν1)] . (F.33)
By substituting the solution (F.33) back into (F.32) and by rearranging the r.h.s, one gets a combination
of gains where all the terms Yn1, Yn2, Yn3, Y0m, Y1m and Y2m are removed:
H40 =
∞∑
n=3
Yn0
n!
A04(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n) +
∞∑
n=3
m=4
Ynm
n!m!
B04(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m, n) ,
(F.34)
where the functions A04 and B04 are the same found in bounding Y04 with four decoys and are given by
(F.10) and (F.12), respectively. Note that in this case the roles of the intensities µi and νi are exchanged
with respect to the bound on Y04 (see F.9), as well as the roles of n and m. Following the same reasoning
of Appendix F.1, we can conclude that the coefficients of Yn0 and Ynm have always opposite sign. Hence
the upper bound on Y40 is obtained from (F.34) by setting all the yields Yn0 (with n 6= 4) to zero and
the yields Ynm (with n ≥ 3, m ≥ 4) to 1. After rearranging the terms, we get the following expression
for the upper bound on Y40:
Y U40 =
24
A04(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 4)
H40 − ∞∑
n=3
m=4
B04(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m, n)
n!m!
 , (F.35)
where H40 is given in the first line of (F.32), while A04(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 4) and the sum of the
series are given in (F.14) and (F.15), respectively, under the replacement µi ↔ νi for i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
We remark that in deriving the bound (F.35) we implicitly assumed –as in the Y04 case– that at least one
of the following equalities does not hold: ν0 = µ0, ν1 = µ1 and ν2 = µ2. Indeed, when all three equalities
hold (i.e. when Alice and Bob are using the same intensities settings for three out of four decoy pulses)
one gets a “ 00 form” in the bound expression (F.35). In order to overcome this issue, one can follow an
analogous procedure to that performed for the same issue affecting the bound on Y04 (see last paragraph
in Appendix F.1), and obtain an additional upper bound on Y40 which is valid in the particular case of:
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ν0 = µ0, ν1 = µ1 and ν2 = µ2. The new bound on Y40 reads:
Y˜ U40 =
24
A˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, ν3, µ3, 4)
H˜40 − ∞∑
n=3
m=4
B˜04(µ0, µ1, µ2, ν3, µ3, n,m)
n!m!
 , (F.36)
where H˜40 is given by:
H˜40 = d˜0,1,2G˜
0,1,2
20 + d˜0,1,3G˜
0,1,3
20 + d˜0,2,3G˜
0,2,3
20 + d˜1,2,3G˜
1,2,3
20 , (F.37)
where:
d˜0,1,2 = 0
d˜0,1,3 = ν3
d˜0,2,3 = − (µ0 − µ1)ν3
µ0 − µ2
d˜1,2,3 =
µ0ν3(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ0 − ν3)
µ1(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ1 − ν3) , (F.38)
and G˜20 are the same gains combinations (F.28), (F.29), (F.30) and (F.31) derived at the beginning of
this Subsection, under the replacements: ν0 −→ µ0, ν1 −→ µ1 and ν2 −→ µ2. The quantity A˜04 and the
sum of the series are instead given in (F.26) and (F.27), respectively, under the replacement µ3 ↔ ν3.
Appendix F.3. Upper bound on Y13
We follow the same procedure used in bounding the other yields in the case of four decoy intensity
settings. We start by considering the four combination of gains in which the terms Yn0, Yn1, Y0m and
Y2m are removed:
G0,1,213 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,213 (n,m) , (F.39)
G0,1,313 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,313 (n,m) , (F.40)
G0,2,313 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,2,313 (n,m) , (F.41)
G1,2,313 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C1,2,313 (n,m) . (F.42)
where the last three combinations are derived from the first one as described in Appendix F.1, while
the first combination is given by (E.44). Now we further combine these expressions with arbitrary real
coefficients di,j,k:
H13 ≡ d0,1,2G0,1,213 + d0,1,3G0,1,313 + d0,2,3G0,2,313 + d1,2,3G1,2,313 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
[
d0,1,2C
0,1,2
13 (n,m) + d0,1,3C
0,1,3
13 (n,m) + d0,2,3C
0,2,3
13 (n,m) + d1,2,3C
1,2,3
13 (n,m)
]
, (F.43)
and impose that even the terms Yn2 and Y3m are removed from the r.h.s. of (F.43). This yields a linear
system of equations in the variables di,j,k, whose unique solution (up to a global rescaling) reads as
follows:
d0,1,2 = 1
d0,1,3 =
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 + µ3)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 + µ2)(ν0 − ν3)
× {µ20(µ1 + µ2)(µ2 + µ3)(ν1 − ν3) + (µ0 + µ2) [µ21(µ2 + µ3)(ν3 − ν0) + µ23(µ1 + µ2)(ν0 − ν1)]}
/
{−µ20(µ1 + µ3)(µ2 + µ3)(ν1 − ν2) + (µ0 + µ3) [µ21(µ2 + µ3)(ν0 − ν2) + µ22(µ1 + µ3)(ν1 − ν0)]}
d0,2,3 = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ2 + µ3)(ν0 − ν1)
(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 + µ2)(ν0 − ν3)
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× {µ20(µ1 + µ2)(µ1 + µ3)(ν2 − ν3) + (µ0 + µ1) [µ22(µ1 + µ3)(ν3 − ν0) + µ23(µ1 + µ2)(ν0 − ν2)]}
/
{−µ20(µ1 + µ3)(µ2 + µ3)(ν1 − ν2) + (µ0 + µ3) [µ21(µ2 + µ3)(ν0 − ν2) + µ22(µ1 + µ3)(ν1 − ν0)]}
d1,2,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ2 + µ3)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ21 − µ22) (µ1 − µ3)(ν1 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3)
{
µ20
[
µ21(ν3 − ν2) + µ22(ν1 − ν3) + µ23(ν2 − ν1)
]
+(µ0µ1µ2 + µ0µ1µ3 + µ0µ2µ3 + µ1µ2µ3)[µ1(ν3 − ν2) + µ2(ν1 − ν3) + µ3(ν2 − ν1)]}
/
{
µ20(µ1 + µ3)(µ2 + µ3)(ν1 − ν2) + (µ0 + µ3)
[−µ21(µ2 + µ3)(ν0 − ν2) + µ22(µ1 + µ3)(ν0 − ν1)]} .
(F.44)
By substituting the solution (F.44) back into (F.43) and by rearranging the r.h.s, one gets a combination
of gains where all the terms Yn0, Yn1, Yn2, Y0m, Y2m and Y3m are removed:
H13 =
∞∑
m=3
Y1m
m!
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3,m)
+
∞∑
n=4
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3,m)Dn(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3) , (F.45)
where:
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3,m) = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ1 + µ2)
× p13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3)
q13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3)
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3
νi1νi2 · . . . · νim−3
 ; (F.46)
p13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3) = µ
2
1
[
µ22(ν0 − ν3)(ν1 − ν2)− µ23(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3)
]
+ µ20
[
µ21(ν0 − ν1)(ν2 − ν3)− µ22(ν0 − ν2)(ν1 − ν3) + µ23(ν0 − ν3)(ν1 − ν2)
]
+ µ22µ
2
3(ν0 − ν1)(ν2 − ν3) ; (F.47)
q13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3) = µ
2
0(µ1 + µ3)(µ2 + µ3)(ν1 − ν2)− µ21(µ0 + µ3)(µ2 + µ3)(ν0 − ν2)
+ µ22(µ0 + µ3)(µ1 + µ3)(ν0 − ν1) , (F.48)
and Dn is defined recursively as [27]:{
Dn(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3) =
∑n−4
j=1 (µ
j
0+µ
j
1+µ
j
2+µ
j
3)Dn−j(µ0,µ1,µ2,µ3)−µ0µ1µ2µ3
(∑
i1≤i2≤...≤in−5 µi1µi2 ·...·µin−5
)
n−4
D4(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3) = µ0µ1µ2 + µ0µ1µ3 + µ0µ2µ3 + µ1µ2µ3 .
(F.49)
We assume that the indexes in the sums run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and we define∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3 νi1νi2 · . . . · νim−3 |m=3= 1. Since Dn ≥ 0 for every n ≥ 4, we deduce that the coeffi-
cients of Y1m and Ynm in (F.45) have always equal sign. Hence the upper bound on Y13 is obtained from
(F.45) by setting all the other yields to zero. After rearranging the terms, we get the following expression
for the upper bound on Y13:
Y U13 =
6H13
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, 3)
, (F.50)
where H13 is given in the first line of (F.43), while A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, 3) is given by:
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, 3) = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(ν0 − ν1)(ν0 − ν2)
(µ1 + µ2)
.
× p13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3)
q13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3)
(F.51)
Appendix F.4. Upper bound on Y31
We follow the same procedure used in bounding the other yields in the case of four decoy intensity
settings. We start by considering the four combination of gains in which the terms Yn0, Yn2, Y0m and
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Y1m are removed:
G0,1,231 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,231 (n,m) , (F.52)
G0,1,331 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,1,331 (n,m) , (F.53)
G0,2,331 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C0,2,331 (n,m) , (F.54)
G1,2,331 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
C1,2,331 (n,m) , (F.55)
where the last three combinations are derived from the first one as described in Appendix F.1, while
the first combination is given by (E.48). Now we further combine these expressions with arbitrary real
coefficients di,j,k:
H31 ≡ d0,1,2G0,1,231 + d0,1,3G0,1,331 + d0,2,3G0,2,331 + d1,2,3G1,2,331 =
∞∑
n,m
Ynm
n!m!
[
d0,1,2C
0,1,2
31 (n,m) + d0,1,3C
0,1,3
31 (n,m) + d0,2,3C
0,2,3
31 (n,m) + d1,2,3C
1,2,3
31 (n,m)
]
, (F.56)
and impose that even the terms Yn3 and Y2m are removed from the r.h.s. of (F.56). This yields a linear
system of equations in the variables di,j,k, whose unique solution (up to a global rescaling) is given in
(F.44), under the replacement: µi ↔ νi for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. By substituting the solution back into (F.56)
and by rearranging the r.h.s, one gets a combination of gains where all the terms Yn0, Yn2, Yn3, Y0m, Y1m
and Y2m are removed:
H31 =
∞∑
n=3
Yn1
n!
A13(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n)
+
∞∑
n=3
m=4
Ynm
n!m!
A13(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n)Dm(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3) , (F.57)
where the functions A13 and Dm are defined in (F.46) and (F.49), respectively. Since Dm ≥ 0 for every
m ≥ 4, we deduce that the coefficients of Yn1 and Ynm in (F.57) have always equal sign. Hence the upper
bound on Y31 is obtained from (F.57) by setting all the other yields to zero. After rearranging the terms,
we get the following expression for the upper bound on Y31:
Y U31 =
6H31
A13(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 3)
, (F.58)
where H31 is given in the first line of (F.56), while A13(ν0, ν1, ν2, ν3, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 3) is given by (F.51)
under the substitution: µi ↔ νi for i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
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